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i. inTroducTion
There is no explicit definition of what constitutes a ‘charitable trust’. S 2 of the Charitable 
Trusts Act 1957 defines it as ‘every purpose which in accordance with the law of New Zealand is 
charitable’.
For a trust to be charitable legally, it must be for the public benefit, meaning:
a) The purpose must be beneficial in a way that is charitable; and
b) The benefit has to be shown to be available to the public, or a significant portion of it, not just 
to a distinct group of particular individual (other than in the case of relief of poverty).1
The definition of ‘charitable’ owes its origins to the list of purposes contained in the Preamble to 
the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses Act 1601.
The preamble stated that the following uses were deemed to be charitable:
a) Relief of the aged, impotent and poor;
b) Maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners;
c) Maintenance of schools;
d) Free scholars in universities;
e) Repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea banks, and highways;
f) Education and preferment of orphans;
g) Relief stock or maintenance of houses of correction;
h) Marriage of poor maids;
i) Support and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed;
j) Relief and redemption of prisoners or captives; and
k) Aid or ease of any poor inhabitant concerning payment of taxes.
These uses suggest that on the one hand the legal definition of charity is wider than the popular 
meaning, and that on the other, the meaning is narrower than the popular meaning.2
The purposes, however, were not exhaustive: ‘those purposes are charitable which that statute 
enumerates or which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment’.3
This view was endorsed by Lord Macnaghten in Commissioner for Special Purposes of the 
Income Tax v Pemsel, whereby he summarised charitable purposes into four categories:4
(a) Trusts for the relief of poverty;
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(b) Trusts for the advancement of education;
(c) Trusts for the advancement of religion;
(d) Trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding 
heads.
It is no surprise perhaps that charitable purposes have been subject to evolution as it is at the mer-
cy of ‘changing institutions and societal values’.5 However, Hammond J tempered this by stating 
that this must be balanced with a need for restraint: ‘new heads of charity should not be allowed to 
spring up overnight without close scrutiny’.6
Statute certainly has had a role in such an evolution: s 61A of the Charitable Trusts Act specif-
ically provides that trusts for recreational and leisure purposes are charitable, and s 38 contains a 
substantial list of purposes that are deemed to be charitable for the purposes of Part 4 of the Act.
ii. The PuBLic BenefiT TesT
To the lay person, the ‘public benefit test’ implies a ‘distinctive, all-encompassing standard’,7 
however, the test is fraught with complexities because of the need to determine such benefit on a 
case by case basis.
Lord Mcnaghten in Pemsel only expressly mentioned the requirement of public benefit in re-
lation the fourth head of charity, however, the element is also required at least in the second and 
third heads. It is arguable whether there is an explicit public benefit test under the first head of 
poverty, although this will be addressed later in the paper.
Public benefit has two issues: firstly that of being public and secondly being of benefit.
The former requires the Court to determine whether the class of persons eligible to benefit 
constitutes the public, or at least a section of it.
The latter concerns whether or not the trust confers a benefit on the public, or a section of it. 
It is irrelevant as to whether the opinion of the creator of the trust believed that the public would 
benefit.8
A. Public Benefit and Blood Tie
A group or class of beneficiaries under a proposed charitable trust that are linked by blood, contract, 
family, association membership or employment, does not fulfil the public benefit requirement.9
Lord Simonds in Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd10 laid down a public benefit 
test that approved the approach taken in Re Compton.11
In Oppenheim, a trust was set up to provide for the education of children of employees or 
former employees of the British-American Tobacco Co Ltd, and its subsidiaries. The total number 
of eligible employees was an estimated 110,000. The House of Lords held that this was not chari-
table for the following reason: ‘a group of persons may be numerous, but if the nexus between 
5 D V Bryant Trust Board v Hamilton CC [1997] 3 NZLR 343, 348 (Hammond J).
6 Ibid.
7 Michael Gousemett, ‘The Public Benefit Test’ {2006] New Zealand Law Journal, No.2, March, 15.
8 Gino Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers, Equity and Trusts in Australia (4th ed, 2006) 748.
9 Ibid 746.
10 [1951] AC 297; [1951] 1 All ER 31, 306.
11 [1945] Ch 123; [1945] 1 All ER 198.
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them is their personal relationship to a single propositus or to several propositi, they are neither 
the community nor a section of the community for charitable purposes’.12
However, this has been subject to criticism: Lord Cross in Dingle v Turner13 suggested that 
what constitutes a section of the public is a question of degree in each case, and Tipping J in Re 
Twigger14 approved Somers J’s statement in NZ Society of Accountants v CIR:15 ‘it is not possi-
ble...to state with confidence how the line is drawn between the two or to say that it is drawn in the 
same way as between different types of charitable trust’.
It is arguable that this is evidence that the courts are favouring a more flexible approach in order 
to avoid be hindered by precedent. However, Dal Pont contends that the acceptance of Lord Cross’ 
view merely condones an artificially broad interpretation of ‘public benefit’, whereas Oppenheim, 
although restrictive, provides certainty in an area of law that is wrought with uncertainties.16
In recent times, however, there has been a shift in the approach with regard to one aspect of the 
public benefit test, that of blood tie.
In August 2001, the IRD published its discussion on Taxation of Mäori organisations.17 The 
document recommended that the Oppenheim principle be overturned.
The recent case of Latimer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue18 emphasised the IRD’s ap-
proach, and adopted the dissenting voice of Lord McDermott in Oppenheim, and found the test 
was inappropriate in respect of Mäori iwi and hapu.19
The evidence before the Court was that an estimated 300,000 Mäori could potentially benefit 
from the treaty claims, and 70,000 had already benefited. To reflect how inappropriate English 
law was in determining such matters, Blanchard J stated that the context of tribes or clans of an-
cient origin was: 20
poles away from the kind of connection which the majority of oppenheim must have been thinking...they 
were more likely thinking of the paradigmatic English approach to family relations...such an approach 
might be though insufficiently responsive to value emanating from outside of the mainstream of English 
common law.
Here then is unequivocal evidence that the principle of public benefit may not be subject to overt 
hindrance by common law principles. Nonetheless, the author submits that Latimer responded to 
a very specific issue, for which there was no clear authority emanating from England, therefore, 
the Court in Latimer took the only realistic approach it could as ‘in New Zealand it is impossi-
ble not to regard the Mäori beneficiaries of a trust as constituting a section of the public for this 
purpose’.21
12 Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd, above n 10.
13 [1972] AC 601; [1972] 1 All ER 878.
14 [1989] 3 NZLR 329.
15 [1986] 1 NZLR 147 (CA), 155.
16 Gino Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers, (2006), above n 8, 747.
17 Inland Revenue Policy Advise Division, Tax Simplification No.2 (August 2001).
18 [2002] 3 NZLR 195.
19 David Brown, The Charities Act 2005 and the Definition of Charitable Purposes, (2005) New Zealand Universities 
Law Review, December 21, 619.
20 Latimer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n18, 208.
21 Gino Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers, (2006), above n 8, 748.
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Specific legislation on this very issue puts the matter beyond any doubt.22 However, the re-
moval of blood tie restrictions does not affect employment or contractual relationships, and these 
may still be fatal to the charitable status of some trusts.
To discuss the concept of public benefit further, the author proposes to discuss the issues as-
sociated with the four heads of Pemsel in turn.
B. Trusts for the Relief of Poverty
Relief of poverty is one of the oldest charitable purposes. It has always been classified as relative, 
so may include those that have fallen on hard times as well as those who have always been poor 
when measured against objective standards. Further, that which constitutes poverty can change 
according to economic conditions, as addressed in D V Bryant v Hamilton City Council.23
It is argued that there is no public benefit requirement for the relief of poverty,24 yet some 
opinions suggest that the public benefit requirement is simply a more generous presumption, as 
opposed to being void;25 this is on the basis that the relief of poverty has a general public benefit.
Jenkins LJ in Re Scarisbrick26 appeared to confirm that the public requirement benefit was not 
as rigorous as that which has been applied in the other categories.
The only public benefit requirement has been that a trust for relief of poverty of named individ-
uals will not be charitable, although if they are described as a class, then this may be permitted.27
on the other hand, with the removal of the blood tie restriction, this anomaly may be of little 
consequence, although it will still apply to employment and contractual relationships.28
However, there may yet be further issues associated with the relief of poverty and the public 
benefit test: the UK has recently enacted the Charities Act 2006. This Act created the Charity 
Commission and gave it wide powers to investigate charity administration and impose sanctions 
where improprieties arise.
This Act has potentially altered some traditional approaches to the issue of public benefit and 
the relief of poverty.
S 2(1) of the Act provides that a charitable purpose is a purpose that falls within the list con-
tained in s 2(2), AND which is for the public benefit.
The purposes that can constitute charitable purposes include the customary four heads under 
Pemsel, as well as a further number of heads that may qualify as having charitable status.
Therefore, even if a purpose falls within s 2(2) of the Act, it will only be charitable if it is for 
the public benefit. This is reiterated in s 3(2), whereby ‘In determining whether that requirement 
is satisfied in relation to any such purpose, it is not to be presumed that a purpose of a particular 
description is for the public benefit’.
The intention therefore appears to be that the relief of poverty will only be considered charitable 
if it can be demonstrated that it is for the public benefit; any presumptions have been removed.29
22 S 5(2)(a) The Charities Act 2005.
23 [1997] 3 NZLR 342 (HC).
24 A Butler, above n 1, 238.
25 D Brown, above n 19, 621.
26 [1951] 1 Ch 622, 649.
27 Ibid.
28 D Brown, above n 19, 621.
29 Matthew Conaglen, ‘English Charity Reform’, (2008) New Zealand Law Journal, No.3, April, 115.
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It may then be that New Zealand courts will have to exercise caution when considering post-
2006 English authorities on the public benefit requirement, and where previously the doctrinal 
rule of precedent appeared to do anything but hinder the relief of poverty, future English au-
thorities may just have the opposite effect.30 Nevertheless, common law may provide an answer 
should there be judicial uncertainty. Tompkins J, in the case of Centrepoint Community Growth 
Trust v CIR,31 notes that ‘public benefit is an essential prerequisite except possibly in respect of 
Macnaghten’s first category of the relief of poverty’. Tompkins J suggests, by his use ‘except pos-
sibly’, that there is only an implied presumption that the relief of poverty is for the public benefit. 
If that is so, then New Zealand courts could rely on this dicta to assist with the application of post-
2006 English authorities when determining the public benefit requirement.
C. Trusts for the Advancement of Education
The general principle governing this head is that the trust must show that learning should be im-
parted, not just that it should be accumulated.32 The establishment and support of schools and col-
leges,33 gifts for the establishment of academics,34 and prizes,35 has long been established.
Case law has seen the scope of this head of charity extend far beyond the phrases in the Pream-
ble that talk of ‘the maintenance of schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities’, 
to the study and dissemination of ethical principles;36 the appreciation of the music of Delius;37 
and the promotion of radio, especially for the young.38
Although the establishment of a diversity of trusts under this head may suggest a judicially-tol-
erant approach, each one must comply with the requirement that it must satisfy the public benefit 
test. Therefore, the question of whether purpose is educational will depend on whether its purpose 
is useful, and the area that has caused most difficulty has been that of the arts and culture.
The problem with the public benefit test with regard to this head is that practical utility has 
never featured strongly in the arts due to its very nature, therefore, the Courts have made some 
potentially controversial decisions, reflecting judicial uncertainty.
In the case of Re Delius,39 expert opinion assisted the Court in finding that a trust to explore the 
unpublished works of Delius would have public utility, therefore upholding the trust; although the 
Court did note that had it been Bach in question, then there would have been no issue. This begs 
the question, therefore, can only famous artists, or artists of standing, be of benefit to the public?
This question appeared to be answered in the affirmative, when in Re Pinion,40 a testator gave 
his studio and contents to enable it to be used as a museum, and Harman LJ proclaimed the con-
tents to be: ‘of no useful object to be served in foisting upon the public this mass of junk’.41
30 Ibid.
31 [1985] 1 NZLR 673. 688.
32 A J oakley, Parker and Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts (8th ed, 2003) 459.
33 Porter’s Case (1592) 1 Co Rep 246.
34 Yates v UC London (1875) LR 7 HL.
35 Chesterman v Federal Commissioners of Taxation [1926] AC 128 (PC).
36 Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565.
37 Re Delius [1957] Ch 299.
38 Clarke v Hill (High Court, Auckland, CP 68/SD99, 2 February 2001, Priestley J).
39 Re Delius. above n 37.
40 [1965] Ch 85; [1963] 2 All ER 1049.
41 Ibid 107.
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However, such decisions are fraught with difficulties as one only has to consider such artists as 
Tracey Emin and Damien Hirst to realise that which may be considered ‘junk’ to one, may be con-
sidered valuable to another, and therefore of public benefit. Brown suggests that with the advent 
of the Charities Commission in New Zealand, it is likely that the Courts will be more tolerant of 
artistic diversity, and prevent precedent from restricting public benefit.42
There is evidence already however, that cultural purposes in New Zealand are being consid-
ered with open-mindedness, as the Working Party acknowledged that cultural purposes should 
be explicitly recognised,43 and the recent Latimer case44 considered that the historical function of 
research into Mäori treaty claims was educational.
It is likely therefore that as further cases challenge the concepts of public benefit under the 
head of education, the Charity Commission will provide guidance as to how this area of law 
should develop in line with the demands of society.
However, there is one area of education that is raising controversial issues, that of the charita-
ble status of independent (fee paying) schools.
Many are registered as charities and ‘are the classic example of charities which charge fees for 
the provision of services’.45 In light of this, the Report from the Strategy Unit suggested that the 
Charity Commission in the UK should undertake a rolling programme to monitor public benefit, 
as the vast majority of such schools ensure the continuance of their charitable status by making 
use of their income to provide free places and allowing the local community to make use of their 
facilities.46
The common law position is that fee-charging in itself does not preclude a school from being 
charitable, provided that the primary purpose is within one of the four heads of charity; that profit 
is reinvested; and that poor sections of society are not excluded.47
However, this area has been litigated on many occasions, and the Oppenheim test, notwith-
standing the removal of the blood tie restriction in New Zealand, still applies. Indeed, Oppenheim 
concerned an educational trust for employees. Therefore, there must be a sufficient section of so-
ciety that is not linked by employment or contractual relations that must be able to benefit.
However, it is argued that in doing so, this gives them an unfair commercial advantage, and 
Brown notes that these are big businesses involved in perhaps key areas of social provision that 
have been traditionally ‘the concern of the Welfare State’.48
Indeed, such concerns have led the British Government to emphasise that such charities must 
be able to impress upon the Charities Commission that an element of their provision for places is 
for the poorer children through scholarships and that they must make their facilities available to 
the community in a variety of ways.49 This is especially valid now that the Charities Act 2006 has 
removed the presumption of public benefit.
42 D Brown, above n 19, 624.
43 Ibid.
44 Latimer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 18.
45 A J oakley, above n 33, 463.
46 Ibid.
47 Re Resch [1969] 1 AC 514.
48 D Brown, above n 19, 625.
49 Home office, ‘Charities and Not-for-Profits: A Modern Legal Framework’ (2003) 10.
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It is suggested that this raises ethical questions as to whether purposes that relieve the State of 
its welfare obligations should actually be charitable.50
Hammond J in Bryant v Hamilton City Council51 provides a reasoned approach in the face 
of such controversy, suggesting that a generous approach of relief and public benefit should be 
taken, given that pressures on the State are increasing continuously. Public benefit therefore may 
be developing apace with such an equitable judicial attitude.
D. The Advancement of Religion
The advancement of religion means the promotion of spiritual teaching in a broad sense, and in-
volves spreading the religious message through taking positive steps such as pastoral activities.52 
In the case of United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free or Accepted Masons of England v Holborn 
Borough Council,53 Freemasonry failed under this heading.
In Centrepoint Community Growth Trust,54 the Court approved the definition of religion giv-
en by Mason ACJ and Brennan J in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax 
(Vic),55 which stated that: ‘the criteria of religion is twofold: first a belief in a supernatural Being...
and second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief’.
The advancement of religion is a charitable purpose only if it is of public benefit. Where the 
purpose is found to be religious, then generally the assumption is that it will have a public ben-
efit, unless that can be rebutted.56 The traditional view, however, was that the gift had to be for 
religious purposes exclusively, although s 61b of the Charitable Trusts Act saves trusts that have 
mixed purposes.
The public benefit element of the advancement of religion has not been without issue for the 
courts, as reflected in Gilmour v Coates.57 This case concerned a declaration of trust to apply 
income for a community of cloistered Catholic nuns, who devoted their lives to prayer, contem-
plation, penance and other worshipful acts, all within the confines of their convent. The House of 
Lords held that this failed the public benefit trust as there was no contact with the outside world.
This appeared to be a anomalous decision as previously courts had been tolerant of religious 
groups based largely on the fact that they did not feel able to formulate a view on faith based on 
‘earthly evidential standards’,58 yet, in this case they were able to make such a judgement, and did 
not contemplate the possibility that such religious practices could have a public benefit even with-
out an actual contact element.
Dal Pont argues that this would not necessarily be followed in New Zealand and Australian 
courts,59 and finds favour with the opinion of Reynolds JA, who made the following comment on 
Gilmour: 60
50 D Brown, above n 19, 625.
51 [1997] 3 NZLR 342.
52 A Butler, above n 1, 244.
53 [1957] WLR 1080; [1957] 3 All ER 281.
54 Centrepoint Community v CIR, above n 31.
55 (1983) 154 CLR 120; 49 ALR 65, 136.
56 Gino Dal Pont, (2000), above n 2, 166.
57 [1949] AC 426.
58 D Brown, above n 19, 623.
59 Gino Dal Pont, (2000) above n 2, 171.
60 Joyce v Ashfield Municipal Council [1975] 1 NSWLR 744, 750.
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This doctrine that religious activities are subject to proof that they are for the public benefit could give 
rise to great problems in that it might lead to the scrutiny by the courts of the public benefit of all reli-
gious practices.
In the more recent case of Crowther v Brophy,61 Gobbo J doubted whether Gilmour would actu-
ally represent Australian law and made reference to a case whereby contemplative life has been 
recognised as having an element of public benefit.62
Australia, at least, has addressed this particular issue: the Extension of Charitable Purposes 
Act 2004 (Cth), s 5(1)(b), states that so long as cloistered or contemplative order offers interces-
sory prayer to any public members that seek it, then this will satisfy the public interest.
English case law appears to have taken a similar approach, suggesting a willingness to com-
promise on such a controversial issue. In the case of Re Hetherington,63 a stipend to a priest was 
held to be a valid charitable trust provided that masses for departed souls were open to the public.
Brown criticises such an approach however.64
This still seems to miss the point that those faiths that believe in cloistered contemplation or prayer, be-
lieve this as part of their faith, and if the law is indeed tolerant of all religions, the imposition of worldly 
human contact test seems petty.
He further suggests that the only test that should be applied is: ‘whether the community is open to 
a sufficient section of the public who wish to join’.65
Interestingly, this seems to mirror the approach being suggested in the inferior Court in Gil-
mour by Lord Greene MR: 66
When...the question is whether a particular gift for the advancement of religion satisfies the requirement 
of public benefit, a question of fact arises which must be answered by the Court in the same manner as 
any other question of fact, that is, by means of evidence cognisable by the Court.
The author submits that Brown’s test above could satisfy the requirements set out by Lord Greene 
MR.
It seems likely however that, notwithstanding Australian statute, the public benefit element 
is likely to continue to raise issues as to whether the courts are really able to determine whether 
religious practices have the required public benefit by simply applying earthly tests to spiritual 
matters.
E. Trusts for Other Purposes Beneficial to the Community Not Falling Under Any of 
 the Preceding Head.
This fourth head is the residual catch all category that ‘recognises charitable purposes that do not 
fall within the first three heads of charity’.67
61 [1992] 2 VR 97, 100.
62 The Association of Franciscan Order of Friars Minor v City of Kew [1967] VR 732.
63 [1989] 2 WLR 1094 (EWHC).
64 D Brown, above n 19, 623.
65 Ibid 623-4.
66 Gilmour v Coates, above n 57, 346.
67 Gino Dal Pont, (2000), above n 2, 172.
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Dispositions under this head must satisfy a two stage test: firstly, the court must be satisfied 
that the purpose is beneficial to the community and secondly, the purpose must fall within the 
spirit of the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses.68
Therefore: 69
not every object which is beneficial to the community can be regarded as charitable...even if the object 
were in some senses beneficial to the community, it would still be necessary to discover that it fell within 
the spirit and intendment of the instances given in the Statute of Elizabeth.
In other words, the two stage test is cumulative, so only dispositions that satisfy both requirements 
will be valid trusts.
The following gifts have been upheld under this head, and reflect the diversity of purposes that 
may be beneficial to the community:70
Gifts for the relief of human distress;71
Gifts for the protection of the environment;72
Gifts for the benefit of animals.73
1. Beneficial to the Community
Unlike the other three heads under Pemsel, for a disposition to be valid under this fourth head, it 
must be ‘beneficial to the community’, which Dal Pont argues is not necessarily the same as hav-
ing ‘public benefit’.74
For example, ‘benefit to the public’ may include benefit in intellectual and artistic fields, as 
well as material benefits, whereas dispositions under the fourth head that offer intangible benefits 
will necessarily require substantiated proof of such benefits.
In other words, ‘for an intangible benefit to constitute a sufficient benefit to the community, 
it...must be approved by the common understanding of current enlightened opinion’.75
A further example is that the range of purposes that may be beneficial to the community is a 
‘dynamic concept’.76 Therefore, as society develops, and concepts and morals change, so disposi-
tions that may benefit a community in one era, may cease to do so in another.
Dal Pont’s final consideration of ‘beneficial to the community’ is that a court will not uphold 
a purpose that is detrimental to the community.77 In National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners,78 the Court denied the Society charitable status, as its objective to abol-
ish animal vivisection would mean that future human medical advancements could fail due to the 
Society’s objectives.
68 Ibid 173.
69 National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissions [1948] AC 31, 41 per Lord Wright.
70 Gino Dal Pont, DRC Chalmers and JK Maxton, Equity and Trusts: Commentary and Materials (4th ed, 2004), 
854-855.
71 Re Darwin Cyclone Tracy Relief Trust Fund (1979) 39 FLR 260).
72 Re Centrepoint Community Growth Trust [2000] 2 NZLR 325, above n 31.
73 Murdoch v Attorney General (Tas) 1992 1 Tas R 117.
74 Gino Dal Pont, (2000) above n 2, 174.
75 Ibid 175.
76 Ibid 176.
77 Ibid.
78 National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners, above n 69.
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As Lord Simonds stated: ‘...however well-intentioned the donor, the achievement of his object 
will be greatly to the public disadvantage, there can be no justification for saying that it is a chari-
table object’.79
A number of contentious issues under this head have arisen over the years, and this paper will 
now consider two specific areas in order to address the original proposition, firstly: trusts for the 
protection of animals; and secondly, trusts for political purposes.
2. Trusts for the Protection of Animals
The protection of animals has long been upheld as a charitable purpose, but this is not because the 
animals themselves provide the charitable element, rather it is the assumption of the benefit to the 
community from being benevolent towards animals that generates that charitable constituent.80
Swinfen Eady LJ in Re Wedgewood provided the seminal statement:81
A gift for the benefit and protection of animals tends to promote and encourage kindness towards them, 
to discourage cruelty, and to ameliorate the condition of brute creation, and thus to stimulate humane and 
generous sentiments in man towards the lower animals, and by these means promote feelings of humanity 
and morality generally, repress brutality, and thus elevate the human race.
Such benefits are neither tangible nor direct, which is in contrast with the requirement of the test 
being beneficial to the community as submitted in the previous page.
Similarly intangible and remote propositions that have no connection with animals have been 
struck out numerous times by the Courts, including gifts for philanthropic purposes;82 gifts for the 
benefit of humanity;83 and gifts for raising the standard of life.84
This therefore creates a paradox: a gift for the protection of animals that indirectly benefits the 
community will invariably be valid, whereas gifts that benefit the general community morally or 
spiritually will invariably be invalid.
The author submits that it is the very factor of the animals themselves that creates the tangible 
element that is required to establish the criteria of the ‘benefit to the community’ under the fourth 
head. Whereas, general gifts that merely benefit the general community are missing that very spe-
cific element, and therefore cannot qualify as a valid charitable trust.
The case of Re Grove-Grady85 also suggests that there must be some element of human contact 
in order to validate the trust, which implies a level of tangibility, as opposed to an ethereal moral-
ity. In this case, a trust to provide refuge for animals that was not open to the public, in which the 
animals were free to prey on each other without human contact, was denied charitable status, as it 
lacked anything that may raise the standard of human conduct.
The author would argue however, that this may simply be an error in the drafting of the trust 
instrument, as in today’s climate, with the upsurge in Zoological and Conservation Parks and 
Reserves, it would not be difficult to establish that such places would have many benefits for the 
community.
79 Ibid 65-66.
80 Gino Dal Pont, (2000), above n 2, 186.
81 [1915] 1 Ch 113 at 122.
82 Re Macduff [1896] 2 Ch 451.
83 Re Bell [1943] VLR 103.
84 Re Payne (deceased) [1968] Qd R 287.
85 [1929] 1 Ch 557.
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Indeed, more recent case law suggests that Re Grove-Grady may not necessarily represent cur-
rent law.
The case of Attorney General v Satwell86 involved a bequest for the preservation of native 
fauna and flora, either by making donations to one or more organisations concerned with wildlife, 
or any other way in which the trustees had discretion. Holland J was influenced by the value of 
preserving native wildlife, stating: ‘the value to the community and the national interest is made 
up of the uniqueness on earth of Australian native wild life, and the interest here and overseas 
excited by its many odd and curious species’87. Holland J elaborated on the aspect of benefit to 
the community by noting that preserving native flora and fauna is of such benefit because firstly, 
there is no substitute for actually observing such things in its natural environment, and secondly, 
there was a great increase in public interest in such matters, and therefore the demands to access 
preserves from the public were increased.88
Holland J went further by noting that even if the public were restricted in their access to the 
reserve, then this would not automatically deny the trust charitable status because there would still 
remain a benefit to the community simply since its very presence would offset any destruction 
occurring outside the refuge and provide an opportunity ‘to study and observe the beauties and 
intricacies of nature’.89
Holland J concluded by noting that since Grove-Grady, ‘there has been a radical change in 
the recognition throughout the world...of value to mankind of the preservation of wildlife in 
general’.90.
It is likely that the New Zealand courts will follow this view, as addressed in Molloy v Com-
missioner of Inland Revenue,91 where it was suggested that current views on conservation would 
be considered differently from that which was decided in Grove-Grady.
The author suggests, however, that Satwell may not necessarily mean that all bequests to set 
up as refuges for wildlife will automatically be declared as having charitable status; instead it is 
likely that the courts will assess the intention of such bequests and the overall benefit that may be 
obtained from such an action.
Indeed, if there were circumstances where there would be little or no benefit to the community, 
or even contrary to its best interests, as illustrated in National Anti-Vivisection Society, then such a 
gift would fail under the fourth head.
Certain charitable trusts for the protection of animals appear to have been hindered little by the 
doctrinal rule of precedent. Indeed, far from being hampered, such trusts seem to have developed 
correspondingly with the global interest in conservation and ecology.
However, precedent may provide a useful counterbalance, as not all gifts to protect animals 
will necessarily be of benefit to the community, and it is against this well-established test that 
each new case must be measured.
86 [1978] 2 NSWLR 200.
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91 [1981] 1 NZLR 688, 696.
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3. Trusts for Political Purposes
At common law, it is a longstanding principle that a voluntary organisation that wishes to acquire 
or retain charitable status must avoid having political purposes and to avoid engaging in most 
forms of political activities. This stems principally from the dicta of one judge, that of Lord Parker 
in Bowman v Secular Society Ltd,92 where he said: 93
a trust for the attainment of political object has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal, but for 
everyone is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the 
Court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public 
benefit, and therefore cannot say that gift to secure the change is a charitable gift.
o’Halloran distinguishes between bodies with political purposes and bodies that engage in po-
litical activities: the former are not charitable and the latter will be charitable if the activities are 
ancillary and subordinate to its non-political activities and purposes.94
The rationale for denying charitable status to bodies engaged in political activity has its foun-
dations in the philosophy that a charity has not submitted itself to the electoral system, and there-
fore is not publically accountable. As such any political activity that a charity undertakes would 
be seen as subverting the ‘established democratic process’.95 As a corollary, the value of charities 
lies in their independence from politics, and such independence would become compromised if 
they pursued political activities. It is also further suggested that charities may gain and lose sup-
port, and this would then undermine the requirement of public benefit, which is crucial in estab-
lishing charitable status.96
In light of such considerations, it is not surprising that charitable trusts and political activity 
have raised judicial concerns. Simons LJ expresses this uncertainty succinctly: ‘it is not for the 
court to judge and the court has means of judging’.97
The case of McGovern v Attorney General98 has been greatly influential in underpinning the 
traditional common law approach to political activities by charities.
In this case, Amnesty International attempted to create a trust in order to have some of its work 
declared charitable. The purposes of this trust were as follows:
1) Looking after the needy e.g. prisoners etc;
2) Promoting the abolishment of capital and corporal punishment;
3) Researching and disseminating information on human rights;
4) Securing the release of political prisoners.
Slade J held that purposes 1 and 3 could be charitable; however, 2 and 4 were political. Slade J 
determined further that the following matters could be construed as political purposes: 99
• To further the interests of a particular political party;
• To procure changes in the laws of this country;
92 [1917] AC 406.
93 Ibid 442.
94 Kerry o’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion, an International Study, (2007), 125.
95 Ibid 126.
96 Ibid.
97 National Anti-Vivisection v Inland Revenue Commissioners, above n 69, 62.
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• To bring about changes in the laws of a foreign country;
• To bring about a reversal of government policy or of particular decisions of governmental authorities, 
in this country;
• To bring about a reversal of government policy or of particular decisions of governmental authorities 
in a foreign county.
Although prima facie it appears that precedent has firmly quashed any development of charitable 
trusts and political purposes, there has been substantial criticism of this approach based on the 
element of public benefit, and indeed some signs that the common law may be offering a more 
flexible approach.
In his dissenting judgment in National Anti-Vivisection v Inland Revenue Commissioners, Lord 
Porter noted that ‘it is curious how scanty the authority is for the proposition that political objects 
are not charitable’.100 The Australian case Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney Gen-
eral101 criticised the distinction between charitable purposes and political objectives, stating that it 
was ‘in an unsatisfactory condition’, and Santow J in Public Trustee v Attorney General102 noted 
that ‘persuasion directed to political change is part and parcel of a democratic society in which 
ideas and agendas compete for attention and allegiance’. Further, Hammond J in the recent case of 
Re Collier (deceased)103 commented:
Is it really inappropriate for a judge to recognise an issue as thoroughly worthy of public debate, even 
though the outcome of that debate might be to lead to a change in the law? After all, it is common place 
for judges to make suggestions themselves for changes in the law today....and we do...live in an age 
which enjoys the supposed benefits of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and expression. Should 
not the benefits be real in all respects, including the law of charities.
In light of such comments, Del Pont suggests that ‘it would appear that the Bowman theory is 
fraying around its edges, and perhaps even in substance’.104
Santow remarks that there is a ‘strong historical tradition of fighting charities, campaigning to 
remove perceived political obstacles in the way of public welfare. Such charities refuse to accept a 
role where they deal only with symptoms, not their political causes’105.
Gousmett concurs, noting that charities have always had a role in society in ‘challenging the 
dictates of government on social policy’.106 In light of this historical background, it is perhaps 
unsurprising then that The Sensible Sentencing Group Trust was incorporated as a charitable trust 
on the 1st February 2002.
This charity has as its aims the following:
1) That within New Zealand and for the benefit of both the local and national communities, provide in 
respect of sentencing for violent and serious criminal offences education as to relevant issues, options 
for reforms and the design and or drafting of appropriate mechanisms, procedures, regulations and or 
100 National Anti-Vivisection v Inland Revenue Commissioners, above n 69, 54.
101 (1938) 60 CLR 396, 426 (Dixon J).
102 (1997) 42 NSWLR 600, 621.
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105 GFK Santow, ‘Charity in its Political Voice: a Tinkling Cymbal or a Sounding Brass?’ (1999) 52 Current Legal 
Problems 255 <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCo_ speech_010799> at 
28/07/08.
106 Michael Gousmett, ‘Charities and Political Activity’ (2007) New Zealand Law Journal, March, 63.
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law for consideration of legislative adoption to help ensure all New Zealanders are adequately insu-
lated and protected from violent and serious criminal offenders.
2) To do any act in furtherance of the charitable objects of the Trust.
It appears obvious that at its heart, this charity has predominately political agendas and activities, 
and yet any person who wishes to be informed of issues ‘relating to the sentencing of criminals 
for violent and serious offences would find the aims...to be unquestionably of public benefit’107. 
The author would argue further that its very aims conflict with the matters that Slade J highlighted 
as being political in the Amnesty case, and one might wonder therefore how such a trust could be 
declared as charitable, in view of common law dictates.
Santow believes that it is possible for a charity to have a political voice, but that it must be 
discrete as ‘a charity can never be sure that the Charity Commissioners will treat that even muted 
voice as merely ancillary activity, not prejudicing its status as a charity’108. 
Santow criticises the absolute approaches taken by Lord Parker in Bowman and Slade LJ’s all 
encompassing list in McGovern, preferring the more implicit language used by Sir owen Dixon 
in Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney General109 whereby the latter notes that ‘it is 
difficult for the law to find that necessary tendency to public welfare’.
This implies therefore that there is a margin of appreciation in the discretion available to the 
courts when judging the public benefit, and although difficult, it is not absolute.
As Santow rightly points out, the Court in National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners ‘had no difficulty in making such a judgment negatively – it held that the law 
change sought was not in the public interest’.110
The author submits that if the Court is able to make such a categorical decision in decid-
ing what is not in the public’s interest, there can be little difference therefore in deciding what 
is beneficial to the community in the context of political objects. There is no judicial comment 
on this particular approach, although Dal Pont suggests that the courts should presume that the 
current law represents that which is beneficial to the community, which could be rebutted where 
appropriate.111
In order to establish whether a charity’s political activities are in the public interest, Santow 
suggests that the courts should apply an objective test, whereby the trust as a whole is scrutinised, 
and that would include its constitution and its activities. This means that the test of public benefit 
would fail ‘where the political activity is disproportionate that it is not longer merely instrumental 
in achieving the indubitably charitable objects, but has become an end itself’.112F
In spite of the increasing criticism of the rigidity with regard to the concept of charities and 
political activities, it seems unlikely that any ‘paradigm shift’113 will take place in the broadening 
of the approach of the courts. Instead, the author submits that the courts will follow the well estab-
lished path laid down by Lord Parker in Bowman v Secular Society Ltd as there is still, rightly, a 
107 Ibid.
108 GFK Santow, above n 105.
109 Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney General, above n 101, 426.
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208 Waikato Law Review Vol 16
marked separation of powers, and it is for Parliament to address the purported imbalances between 
contemporary social need and the constraints of charitable trusts.
iii. concLusion
The public benefit test has challenged the common law constraints on many occasions, and on 
relatively few occasions has there been any substantial shift in the judicial approach. The case 
of Latimer v Commissioners of Inland Revenue suggests that the rule of precedent is not as rigid 
as once presumed, however, as the author submitted, the case responded to very specific circum-
stances, and in fact, the more rigid test established in Oppenheim is still good law.
The challenge for the courts is how to apply a test in the ever changing social and political 
modern world. Case law suggests that the courts are able to apply discretion where society brings 
pressure to do so, however, it is under the Pemsel’s fourth head, where there is perhaps the most 
contention. In these situations, the doctrine of precedent may seem unyielding, but perhaps this 
very rigidity should be cautiously welcomed, as it provides a degree of certainty in an area of law 
that is dogged with uncertainty. If that is so, then the principle of public benefit is not so much 
being hindered by precedent, rather it is being protected and providing an element of surety to this 
branch of law.
